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I.  Introduction
Policy analysts must make tough choices:  should they use a model where the economic
behavior is stripped down and easy to understand, but whose fit to data is crude, or should they
use a model whose fit and forecast performance are good, but where the economic behavior is
not very detailed?  The need to tell tidy stories frequently dominates the desire to fit data.  This is
not a choice between “simple” and “complex,” though it is sometimes couched as such.  A model
must be simple if it’s to be understood.  It must be understood if it’s to inform policy debates.
Unfortunately, we understand models on a qualitative level, while we use them for policy
analysis on a quantitative level.  Tensions arise in moving from qualitative discussion to
quantitative prediction.
The tensions are well illustrated by two popular approaches to empirical analysis of monetary
policy:  the New Keynesian (NK) and the identified vector autoregression (VAR) approaches.
Stylized models of private behavior coupled with simple rules describing policy behavior
characterize New Keynesian work.  Vector autoregressions consist of minimally identified
dynamic descriptions of private behavior coupled with a detailed rule for policy behavior.
1
                                                
1 New Keynesian work is associated with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000,
1999), McCallum and Nelson (1999) and identified VARs with Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996), Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), Bernanke and Mihov (1998).  A third approach combines simple Taylor-type rules
with large econometric models of the economy, as in Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993), Taylor (1993b), and Levin,
Wieland and Williams (1999).2
The choice between the two approaches wouldn’t matter if they offered the same
interpretations of policy behavior and the same predictions for the impacts of changes in policy.
But they don’t.
Much of the appeal of New Keynesian models derives from their simplicity.  Implications of
the model are easy to communicate and have rapidly become a standard framework for
discussing monetary policy.  Simple models often produce stark conclusions.  NK models deliver
the stark conclusion that good monetary policy calls for the central bank to adjust the nominal
interest rate more than one-for-one with inflation.  Some authors argue that Federal Reserve
behavior under Alan Greenspan is superior – nearly optimal, by some calculations – to Fed
behavior before Paul Volcker became chair in 1979.
2  New Keynesian researchers base their case
that policy has improved on estimates of the parameter that determines how much the Fed
adjusts the federal funds rate when inflation changes.  Estimates of a stronger response to
inflation after 1979 than before 1979 underlie the NK case.  An unstable policy rule is the
linchpin in the NK case that monetary policy has improved.  VARs, in contrast, tend to find little
evidence either of important instability in policy parameters or instability in the dynamic impacts
of exogenous shifts in policy.
3
Simplicity also makes New Keynesian models vulnerable.  In simple models behavioral
relationships are tightly circumscribed and sparsely parameterized.  As a consequence, each
parameter carries a hefty share of the model’s implications:  the value of a single parameter can
mean the difference between inferring that policy was stabilizing or destabilizing.  Because
dynamics are carefully pruned, there is a great deal of simultaneous behavior.  It is no surprise
                                                
2 See, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) or Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2000).
3 For example, Bernanke and Mihov (1998a, 1998b), Sims (1999), Leeper and Zha (1999), or Hanson (2000b).3
that this environment breeds identification problems.
4  Taken together, simplicity and
simultaneity make it very difficult to nail down estimates of critical parameters.  Despite this
difficulty, single-equation estimation techniques constitute the bulk of the empirical work in the
NK literature.
Identified VARs lie at the opposite end of the spectrum.  Behavioral relationships are loosely
consistent with theory.  Dynamics are intricate, typically unrestricted, and difficult to interpret.
This makes the output of VARs hard to communicate, and the models often get treated as black
boxes.  Simultaneity is kept to a minimum:  some of the most widely cited VAR models contain
none at all.  These blunt identifying assumptions, though controversial, can produce robust
results.  Rarely does instability of a single VAR parameter carry important qualitative
implications.
The two approaches share the objective of explaining post-war U.S. data.  Identifying
assumptions, which are what link economic behavior to economic data, sharply distinguish NK
and VAR approaches.  We pursue that distinction to explore the identification problems that
plague any attempt to tease policy behavior out of the tangle of dynamic correlations in macro
time series.  We take the view that NK models are restricted VARs.  Dynamic optimizing
behavior generates both linear and cross-equation restrictions.  The latter group typically arises
to ensure that expectations are rational and consistent with the model’s predictions.
In section II we use an off-the-shelf New Keynesian model to obtain identifying restrictions
in a three-variable model.  We argue that identification problems pervade the model.  Calibration
                                                
4 New Keynesian models are not unique in this regard.  Virtually all dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
suffer from the kind of identification problems that concern us [see Canova and Pina (2000)].4
offers one solution to these problems.  For example, calibrating key private parameters or policy
parameters can deliver economically sensible system estimates.
In those models it can be misleading to base inferences about the effects of policy solely on
estimated policy parameters.  Section III displays models that are stable despite the fact that
policy parameters do not satisfy the New Keynesian criterion for “stabilizing” policy.
Some of the New Keynesian models’ simplicity stems from their position on money:  it’s
irrelevant.  Money plays no role in the transmission of monetary policy, in the setting of
monetary policy, or in the formation of expectations about policy.  The monetary sector is a
sideshow.  Section IV introduces money.  Although this creates some new identification
challenges, we argue that interpretations of historical policy behavior can change dramatically
once money is reintroduced into the analysis.  Estimates in that section rely on identifying
assumptions that separate the behavior of money demanders from the behavior of the monetary
authority.  Our results underscore, however, that understandings of behavior can change
drastically when one moves away from relying on reduced-form correlations.
Section V puts a sharp point on the tradeoff between simplicity and robustness of inferences.
The identified VARs that we report in that section display remarkable stability across sub-
periods in the post-war data.  The stability implies there may not have been important changes in
the dynamic responses of the economy to exogenous shifts in policy, raising doubts about the
premise of the NK conclusion of superior policy performance in the past 20 years.
Policy may, in fact, have improved over time.  But New Keynesians don’t make the case.
Some authors argue that because the behavioral equations in New Keynesian models emerge
from optimization, it is reasonable to treat them as invariant to policy [Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), Woodford (1999b)].  Similar claims cannot be made for equations in identified VARs.5
Instead, building on Sims (1987), that literature contends that VARs are linear approximations to
an underlying nonlinear model and that for many practical policy questions, the linear
approximations may be quite accurate [see Leeper and Zha (1999)].  We shall not pursue this
topic further here; rather, we accept that for the class of policy interventions we think best
characterizes routine FOMC analysis, both approaches estimate private behavioral equations that
are approximately invariant.
II.  A Canonical New Keynesian Model
In this section we lay out a slight variant of the stylized New Keynesian model that forms the
basis of the monetary policy analyses in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, 2000), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997, 1999), Woodford (1999a, 1999b), and elsewhere.  Under certain
parameterizations, the model specializes to Taylor’s (1999b) reduced-form model.  The
empirical results in this section relate to Taylor’s version of the model estimated with U.S. data
over the period from 1959:1 to 2000:2.
II.1 The Theoretical Model
Because the micro foundations of the model are well known, we shall simply write down the
relevant log-linearized equations.
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and the aggregate supply (AS) or price setting equation is:
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where x is the “output gap,” defined as actual output minus potential output:
.
p
tt t x yy =−
i is the nominal interest rate, which is set by the monetary authority;  p is the aggregate price
level and  1 tt p p − −  is the inflation rate at t;
6 
IS ε  is an exogenous process reflecting non-monetary
policy sources of aggregate demand; 1 σ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution; r is the
steady state real interest rate; κ  is an indicator function equal to 0 or 1; θ =and ψ  lie on the unit
interval; 
AS ε  is an exogenous process reflecting deviations from the condition that real marginal
cost and the output gap are proportional; β  is the discount factor.  The expectation  t E  is taken
with respect to an information set that contains all variables dated t and earlier.
As written in (1) and (2), we allow for the possibility of both forward- and backward-looking
behavior in the IS and AS relationships.  The parameters θ  and ψ  determine the extent to which
behavior looks forward and backward.  We are less concerned with whether backward-looking
behavior can be sensibly rationalized in an optimizing framework than we are in extracting the
model’s implications for empirical work.  To that end, it is desirable to work with a flexibly
parameterized model.
Complete the model with the monetary policy (MP) rule
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5 Although strictly speaking, IS involves output, rather than the output gap, in (1) we follow the convention in the
New Keynesian literature.
6 In the empirical work below, we convert this to the annual rate 4( ) 1 pp t t − − .  To avoid notational clutter, we leave
the conversion out of the theoretical expressions.7
where ω  is a parameter that allows for partial adjustment to the target interest rate, determining
the degree of interest rate smoothing, and 
MP ε  is a policy disturbance.   1 π γ  describes how policy
responds to inflation, and is the parameter that receives the most attention in the NK literature.
π  and µ  are target levels for inflation and money growth.  This rule represents a substantial
generalization of the class of rules typically considered in New Keynesian research, as it allows
policy choice to depend on the lagged inflation rate and output gap, as well as on current and
past money growth.
7  The rule that Taylor (1993a, 1999a, 1999b) employs, and is now nearly
standard equipment in a New Keynesian model, sets i solely as a function of the current inflation
rate and output gap:
01 1 1 MP(Taylor): [( ) ] .
MP
tt t x t t ip px π γγ π γ ε − =+ − −+ + (4)
The two exogenous processes associated with private behavior are {, }
IS AS
tt ε ε  and {}
MP
t ε  is the
exogenous part of policy behavior.
II.2 Potential Identification Problems
Nearly all the New Keynesian papers assume certain values for the private parameters in (1)
and (2).  They then estimate the policy parameters using ordinary least squares or instrumental
variables methods or they impose particular policy parameters.  Suppose instead that the reduced
form – or solved-out version – of (1), (2), and (3) were to be estimated simultaneously.
Although the reduced form confounds private parameters and policy parameters, we may work
with it as long as we do not intend to change policy parameters while holding fixed the reduced-
form parameters in the non-policy equations.  We can even solve the model numerically, noting
                                                
7 Papers by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Bernanke and Woodford (1997) also include policy responses to
expected inflation and output.  This makes little difference for our purposes.8
where possible the linear restrictions the model implies, and then imposing those restrictions on
our estimation.  In this procedure we concentrate on restrictions on contemporaneous interactions
among variables, which are the most common identifying restrictions used in empirical work.
Because cross-equation restrictions are often at odds with data, we limit ourselves to the linear
restrictions that theory implies.
Inspection of the three equations of the model suggests the potential for several identification
problems to arise.  First, both IS and policy link the current nominal rate to inflation and the
output gap.  If inflation is close to a random walk, then both equations involve ( , , ) tt t x i π , and
without additional restrictions they cannot be distinguished.  This is a critical problem, as it
potentially confounds monetary policy impacts with other sources of disturbance to aggregate
demand, leading to misleading interpretations of the role of monetary policy.
Taylor (1999b) resolves the identification problem by considering the model that emerges
when  0 0, 0, κλ == and  1 ψ = .  In that case, the reduced-form expression for IS makes
() tt t t xa i r π ξ =− − + , for some coefficient a, producing an additional restriction that separates IS
from monetary policy.
8  If, in contrast to Taylor’s specification, the IS curve is dynamic
( 1, [0,1) κθ =∈ ), then Taylor’s additional restriction does not hold generally, and nothing
distinguishes the reduced forms for IS and policy.
One way to separate IS and MP is to adopt the approach taken in some of the identified VAR
literature and advocated by McCallum (1999) in NK models:  an operational rule cannot make
policy choice depend on variables the Fed does not observe contemporaneously.  Because the
Fed does not observe inflation and output contemporaneously, we might posit the rule9
021 2 2 1 MP(Taylor lagged): [( ) ] .
MP
tt t x t t ip px π γγ π γ ε −− − =+ − −+ + (5)
This rule equates the statistical innovation in the federal funds rate to the exogenous disturbance
in monetary policy.  Unfortunately, it is well documented that this identification can generate
empirical anomalies; a prominent anomaly is that an exogenous monetary contraction raises the
funds rate, lowers output, and raises the inflation rate [see, for example, Gordon and Leeper
(1994)].
Although it is no longer fashionable to include money in models of monetary policy, the Fed
does observe growth rates of various monetary aggregates contemporaneously.  And for much of
the post-war period the Fed established target growth rates for aggregates.  These targets have
been pursued with varying degrees of vigilance over the years because, when velocity is fairly
predictable, money growth can be informative about future inflation.  Adding current money
growth to the policy rule in (5) produces
01 1 21 2 2 1 M P ( w i t h  m o n e y ) : [ () ] [ () ] .
MP
tm t t t t x t t iM M p p x π γγ µγ π γ ε −− − − =+ − −+ − −+ + (6)
A policy rule like (6) carries two important implications.  First, money is no longer an appendage
to the New Keynesian model.  Now interaction of supply and demand in the money market
determines the money stock and the nominal interest rate simultaneously.  This raises the tricky
problem of separating money demand and monetary policy.  Second, the dynamic IS and AS
relationships imply that current inflation and output depend on the entire expected future path of
policy.  If money enters the policy equation, then it plays a role in forming expectations of
policy.  The reduced forms for IS and AS now must include the current money stock.
                                                
8 In this case,  11 1 x t tt πλ π =+ −− , so the IS relationship implies  1( 1 ) 1 a σλ =− − .10
The presence of money in the IS equation raises a new identification problem.  Now both IS
and money demand include output, the price level, the nominal interest rate, and the money
stock.  Without further restrictions, IS and money demand are indistinguishable.  Homogeneity
restrictions play a prominent role in money demand regressions; in fact, the money demand
relationship is usually written in terms of the demand for real money balances, reflecting one
homogeneity restriction.  Another restriction, which many general equilibrium models of money
demand imply, is unitary income elasticity.  Some VAR work has found it necessary to impose
both homogeneity restrictions to model the money market [e.g., Cushman and Zha (1997)].
II.3 Estimated Models
We now illustrate some of these identification problems with estimated models.  The reduced
form for the New Keynesian model with three endogenous variables can be written as
01 1 2 2 , tt t t XA C X A X A ε −− ′′ ′ ′ =+ + + (7)
where  (,, , )
p
tt t t t Xy p i y ′ = , C is a vector of intercept terms, and  (, , )
IS AS MP
tt t t εε ε ε ′ = .
9  We take
the exogenous disturbances to be i.i.d. with  (0, ) t N I ε  .  In the estimation, we follow tradition
and treat potential output, 
p y , as exogenous and estimate an AR(1) process for it.  Adding 
p y  to
the model in an exogenous block alters the order condition substantially:  it buys us three zero
restrictions while adding only one free parameter.  Most New Keynesian work, however,
includes the gap, rather than y and 
p y  separately.  To keep in the spirit of that work, we assess
the order condition as if we estimated the model in terms of (, ,) x pi.
                                                
9 We impose restrictions to express equations in terms of inflation or the output gap.11
All data are quarterly and all but the interest rate are seasonally adjusted.  The estimation
period in this section runs from 1959:1 to 2000:2.  y is real GDP (chained 1996 dollars), p is the
personal consumption expenditures deflator (chained 1996 dollars), i is the federal funds rate,
p y  is the Congressional Budget Office’s measure of potential GDP (chained 1996 dollars).  We
choose to estimate data in terms of levels, rather than growth rates, in order to connect the work
more closely to the identified VAR literature.  We impose all the linear restrictions implied by
the New Keynesian model and execute maximum likelihood estimation.
10  All variables are
logged except the funds rate, which is in percent.
In the models reported below we display both the estimated parameters and the impulse
response functions computed from
(), tt XB L ε = (8)
where  ()
1 2
01 2 () BL A A L AL
−
′′ ′ =−− .
Because many of our points are logical, illustrating the nature of identification problems,
rather than statistical, we do not report standard errors or error bands for most of the estimated
models.
Taylor’s (1999b) Model
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10 First we obtain maximum likelihood estimates of  0 A ; then we obtain estimates of ( , , ) 12 A AC , conditional on the
MLE of  0 A .12
where  1 tt t p p π − =−  is the inflation rate.  In this model,  t π  is inertial or predetermined, while  t x
and  t i  are determined simultaneously.  Based on restrictions on  0 A  alone, the model is not
identified unless some additional restriction is imposed.  Taylor imposes that the coefficients on
the nominal rate and inflation in the IS equation are equal and of opposite sign.
11  Imposing that
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With the exception of the AS relationship, none of these parameters is reasonable.  IS and
MP relationships are confounded:  the pattern of coefficients in IS makes more sense as a policy
rule and that in the policy equation makes more sense as an IS curve.  Figure 1 confirms this
interpretation.
13  The shock identified as IS raises the funds rate and lowers output (although only
slightly), while the shock identified as MP raises output, the price level, and the funds rate.  The
latter is reasonable when interpreted as an endogenous response of policy to higher output and
inflation; it is unreasonable when interpreted as an exogenous monetary policy contraction.
Without further restrictions, there appears to be no way to separate the two components of
aggregate demand in the model.  We turn now to two alternative solutions to this problem.
                                                
11 In Taylor’s model, the current output gap is excluded from AS.  This exclusion restriction is necessary for
identification from restrictions on  0 A  alone.  Without it, the model is underidentified for two reasons:  because it
adds the coefficient on  xt  in AS and because if  xt  enters AS, then the restriction on IS that the coefficients on i and
π =be equal and of opposite sign no longer holds.  See footnote 8.
12 The process for potential output is estimated to be  .0297 .998 1
pp
yy t t =+ − .
13 All figures depict impulse responses that have been multiplied by 100.13
Calibration as Identification
Perhaps the most popular solution to identification problems is to impose parameter values
obtained from other data sets or previous research.  While this approach gained popularity
initially in the real business cycle literature, its popularity has carried over to research using New
Keynesian models.  We show that transporting parameters from other studies certainly can solve
the identification problems inherent in separating IS from MP.  First we impose the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution 12 σ = , which is within the range of values used in the literature, and
freely estimate the remaining parameters.
14  Next we impose  1 1.5 π γ =  and  .5 x γ =  in the Taylor
rule and estimate the rest of the model.  Both approaches produce sensible results, with monetary
policy shocks having important effects on output.  Inflation, however, appears to be entirely an
aggregate supply phenomenon.
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where underlining indicates an imposed parameter value.
All the estimated parameters are reasonable.  The IS elasticity with respect to inflation is
positive, as one would expect if output depends on the real interest rate.
Most striking are the estimated policy parameters.  The Fed raises the funds rate more than
one-for-one with the inflation rate.  It raises the funds rate about 150 basis points in response to a
                                                
14 Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) estimate  .16 σ = , producing an IS interest elasticity of -6.25, while McCallum
and Nelson (1999) estimate  4.93 σ = , making the interest elasticity -.20.  Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Gali,
Lopez-Salido and Valles (2000) calibrate their models to log preferences, so  1 σ = .14
1% increase in the output gap.  A coefficient on inflation that exceeds one implies stabilizing
policy, according to the standard interpretations of the policy rule [e.g., Taylor (1999b) or
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999)].  The system estimates in (11) are in sharp contrast to OLS
estimates of the policy rule over this period:
1 OLS: ( ) .03 , .86 .14
(.003) (.07) (.07)
tt t t ip p x − =− − + (12)
which would seem to suggest that policy was not stabilizing on average since 1959.  The
substantive difference in estimates underscores the importance of estimating policy behavior and
private behavior simultaneously.  Inferences about policy behavior based on the system estimates
in (10) are qualitatively different from those based on single-equation estimates in (12).
Figure 2 displays the system’s responses over four years to exogenous disturbances.  The
third column records that monetary policy has important effects on output:  a 100-basis-point
exogenous contraction reduces output by 2 percent (as the calibrated value for σ = implies),
though the effects die out immediately.  Policy disturbances matter for output, accounting for
over a third of its variability.  Exogenous shifts in policy, however, have little impact on
inflation.
Policy is strongly endogenous.  Policy disturbances account for 20 percent of the variation in
the funds rate over the first year and for 10 percent over longer horizons.  Endogeneity of policy
shows up in the responses of the funds rate to IS and AS disturbances.  An IS shock that
increases the output gap and gradually raises the price level, brings forth a higher funds rate.  An
outward shift in AS persistently raises the output gap, permanently lowers the price level, and
induces the Fed to lower the funds rate.  Only very gradually does the Fed return the rate to its
initial level.15
Monetary policy shocks are the dominant source of output variation – 75 percent over the
four-year horizon – and AS disturbances are the sole source of price level movements – more
than 98 percent over the horizon.  AS shocks also account for three-quarters of funds rate
variability at four-year horizons.
Figure 3 displays the time paths of structural shocks implied by the estimated model.  With
the exception of the AS shock, the estimated disturbances exhibit strong patterns of serial
correlation, which arise from the absence of dynamics in the behavioral equations.
15  The time
path of the monetary policy disturbances in the bottom panel of the figure resembles the “policy
mistakes” that Taylor (1999a) reports in his historical analysis of policy rules.  Taylor computes
the gap between the actual funds rate and value of the rate implied by two policy rules.  He
concludes that when the gap was positive the funds rate was “too high,” and when it was
negative the funds rate was “too low.”  In Figure 3, a positive value of 
MP ε  is an exogenous
tightening of policy and a negative value is an exogenous loosening.  Unlike Taylor, the figure
does not report that policy in the early 1960s was “too loose.”  It is consistent with Taylor’s
findings that in the second half of the 1960s and the 1970s policy was “loose,” while in the early
to mid-1980s policy was “tight.”  The figure is also generally consistent with Taylor in finding
that through the 1990s “policy mistakes” were small.
We are unwilling, however, to draw the normative conclusions Taylor does.  In the model, as
Figure 2 attests, exogenous shifts in policy have unrealistically large impacts on output and
essentially no impacts on inflation.  We prefer to link normative statements about policy to the
                                                
15 Clearly these errors are not i.i.d., as assumed in the estimation.  Rather than estimate patterns of serial correlation
for the shocks to render some residuals white noise, we prefer to account for the data’s persistence through
behavioral relationships.  Allowing serially correlated errors would not contribute to the economic interpretation of
the data.16
impacts policy has on variables that affect private agents’ welfare.  If those estimated impacts are
implausible, it seems premature to deduce how well policy has performed from the estimated
pattern of residuals in the policy equation.
The data strongly reject (11), a model with severely pruned dynamics.  Letting ξ  denote
twice the difference of the log likelihoods of the unrestricted and restricted models,
2(log( ) log( )) UR L L ξ =− , we find  775.06 ξ = , which has p-value 0.00.  Critical values for the
Schwarz and Akaike criteria are 122.4 and 48.
Imposing that policy is set according to the parameters Taylor (1993a, 1999a) employs
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where underlining indicates imposed parameter values.  The qualitative impacts of the three
disturbances are much like those depicted in Figure 2, and are not reported.  Because the model’s
parameters are different, however, the quantitative implications differ somewhat.  The estimated
interest elasticity of IS is lower than in system (11), so the output effects of policy disturbances
in this model are smaller, accounting for no more than 35 percent of output variability.  AS
shocks explain one-quarter of output forecast error variance and 80 percent of funds rate
variability over four-year horizons.
It is difficult to distinguish the reduced-form expressions for IS and MP that emerge from the
New Keynesian model without introducing additional restrictions.  We showed that imposing an
interest elasticity of IS of –2.0, which is in the ballpark for calibrated New Keynesian models,
can solve the identification problem.  Estimates of policy behavior over the 1959:1 to 2000:2
period are consistent with the interpretation that the Fed has, on average, been stabilizing:  it17
raised the federal funds rate more than one-for-one with inflation.  This result comes from
system estimates; OLS estimates of policy behavior produce a response to inflation that is
substantially below 1.0.  Although we solved the identification problem, the estimated models
imply little role for monetary policy in influencing inflation.
III.  Inferences About Stability Based on Policy Parameters
One piece of conventional wisdom to emerge from the New Keynesian work on monetary
policy is that policy is stabilizing when it raises the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one
with the inflation rate.  This increases the real interest rate, the argument goes, reduces aggregate
demand, and counteracts the incipient inflation.  In Taylor’s policy rule, (4), this requires that
1 1 π γ > .  Several authors have drawn inferences about policy’s impacts on the economy based on
estimates of  1 π γ  [e.g., Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, 2000), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,
1999), and Taylor (1999a)].
Stability is a characteristic of an equilibrium and, as such, is an implication of a model.
Much of the recent work on simple rules may give the impression that one can deduce this model
implication merely by estimating a policy rule.  Implicitly, many authors are conditioning their
assertions about the magnitude of a particular policy parameter on the structure and parameter
values of an entire model.
Two different but related interpretations of U.S. monetary policy behavior before the
Volcker-Greenspan era stem from inferences about stability drawn from estimated policy rules.
Taylor (1999b) argues in the following way that policy is “stabilizing” when  1 1 π γ > .  Modify the
AS relationship in his model, (9), to be
11 1 AS: .
AS
tt t t x πλ δ π ε −− =++ (14)18
Substituting MP into IS and the resulting expression for x into AS yields a first-order difference
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Taylor imposes  1 δ = .  In that case, if  11 ,, 0 x λσγ >, which are reasonable assumptions, then
1 1 π γ >  is necessary and sufficient for (15) to be a stable difference equation.  Suppose the
economy is hit by an adverse AS shock that increases inflation.  A sufficiently strong policy
response to the initial increase in inflation raises the real interest rate, reduces output, and
stabilizes inflation.  In the absence of a strong policy response, output might rise and, through the
AS relationship, raise inflation still more in the future.  The process can be explosive.
A second interpretation of the implications of  1 1 π γ <  comes from Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000).  In a maximizing model with typical assumed
values for private parameters,  1 1 π γ <  implies that sunspot equilibria cannot be ruled out.
Expectations of higher inflation that arise for unexplained reasons can be self-fulfilling.  Sunspot
fluctuations may arise because agents rationally believe that the Fed will accommodate higher
expected inflation by letting short-term real interest rates fall, stimulating aggregate demand, and
raising inflation further.  We do not pursue this interpretation in the present paper.
Both interpretations rely on estimates of  1 π γ  that are substantially below 1.0 in the United
States before 1979.
We can see precisely the phenomenon that Taylor discusses when we reestimate the model in
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The critical policy parameter, the response of the funds rate to inflation is substantially less than
one at .671.  According to conventional wisdom, policy was not stabilizing.  Impulse response
functions in Figure 4 bear out the conventional wisdom.  Although the short-run patterns make
economic sense, the responses to AS shocks are explosive, with output, the price level, and the
funds rate shooting off to negative infinity.  Explosiveness stems from the source Taylor
highlights:  the eigenvalue of the model’s difference equation in inflation in (15) exceeds 1.0.
16
It may be surprising that an important ingredient in generating instability is the restriction
that  1 δ =  in the AS specification in (14).  We turn to the New Keynesian model laid out in
section II, but move away from the specific parameterization Taylor used.  Instead, we consider
an environment in which behavior in both the IS and the AS equations is dynamic.
To obtain restrictions motivated by the theoretical New Keynesian model, we calibrate and
solve the model, deriving the theory’s analogs to the  012 (,,,) AAAC matrices in the estimated
model, (7).  We then apply the pattern of linear restrictions implied by the theory to our
empirical model.
17  Let  ( , , ) tt t t Xx p i ′ =  and order the equations (IS,AS,MP).  Let column j of  i A
represent equation j, j = IS,AS,MP.  As an example, the pattern matrices for Taylor’s (1999b)
model, specified in (9) and estimated in (10), are
                                                
16 The largest eigenvalue is estimated to be 1.036.
17 Because we do not impose the cross-equation restrictions that the theory implies, the empirical model may be
underidentified even when the theoretical model is not.20
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(17)
where ×  denotes a freely estimated coefficient, 0 denotes a coefficient that is excluded, and  i ×
denotes a coefficient estimated subject to a linear restriction.  After estimation, setting the
diagonal terms in  0 A  to 1 normalizes the matrices.  There are six freely estimated parameters in
0 A , so the model is just identified.
18
We now consider other versions of the New Keynesian model.  IS and AS relationships are
dynamic with both forward- and backward-looking behavior; policy follows the Taylor rule
2 1.5 .5 tt t ix π =+ + .
19  The reduced form for this model implies the pattern matrices
01 11 2
00 000
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(18)
Now the model determines all three variables simultaneously.  With 8 free parameters in  0 A , the
model is not identified.  We follow Taylor in forcing the effect of the output gap on inflation to
occur with a one-period lag (making  0(1, 2) 0 A =  and  1(1, 2) A =× ), and we add the restriction that
the nominal interest elasticity of IS is –2.0:   0 1 ( (3,1)) A σ == .  The estimated model for the
period 1959:1 to 1979:3 is
                                                
18 As (17) makes clear, there are additional restrictions among coefficients across the  Ai  matrices.  When we
evaluate the order condition, we do not count these, and focus exclusively on restrictions on  0 A .  One could instead
investigate achieving identification through the dynamic restrictions.
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Although we did not impose that the AS function can be written in terms of the inflation rate, the
estimates are very close to  11 .025 .962 tt t x ππ −− =+ .  As in system (16), we estimate that the
policy response to inflation is well below one-for-one.  This model, however, does not display
the instability following AS shocks that appears in the previous model.  Figure 5 displays the
impulse response functions over a four-year horizon.  All the responses look reasonable and
converge after about 10 years.  The absolute values of the largest eigenvalues of the estimated
system are .996 and .997.  Evidently,  1 1 π γ >  isn’t necessary for stability.
Although the estimated response of policy to inflation is weak, policy behavior is strongly
endogenous.  Over forecast horizons of 1 to 4 years, over 20 percent of the fluctuations in the
funds rate are due to IS shocks and 45 percent are due to AS shocks.  Inflation is again estimated
to be primarily an aggregate supply phenomenon, with 85 to 100 percent of price level variation
due to AS shocks.  Policy disturbances simply do not move the price level very much, though
they are more important than IS shocks in accounting for output fluctuations in the short run (60
versus 40 percent).
In spite of the widespread belief that the Fed raised the funds rate less than one-for-one with
inflation in the period from 1959:1 to 1979:3, it is worthwhile estimating the same model with
identification achieved by imposing the policy rule  0 1.5 .5 tt t ix γπ =+ + .  With these two
restrictions on  0 A , we now freely estimate the interest elasticity of IS ( 0(3,1) A ) and the
contemporaneous effect of output on price setting behavior ( 0(1, 2) A ).  The model determines
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Once again the model is stable, with largest eigenvalues equal to .997 and .999.  Dynamic
responses to exogenous disturbances look reasonable, as shown in Figure 6.  The most notable
quantitative difference between this model and the previous one, (19), is that now IS and MP
disturbances are more important sources of inflation variation, accounting for 25 percent each
over horizons of four years.  AS shocks continue to be the dominant source of inflation in the
short run, but over longer periods, aggregate demand is as important as aggregate supply.
We also estimated two versions of the New Keynesian model where AS behavior is forward
looking only.  IS continues to be forward and backward looking.  Eliminating backward-looking
price setting behavior has the effect of excluding current inflation from the IS equation.  The
resulting pattern matrices are
01 2 11 2 2
0 0 000
0 ,      0 ,      0 0 0 .
0 00 0 000
AAA
××× × 
 =× × =× × = 
 ×× 
(21)
One more restriction on  0 A  is again needed to identify the model.  We considered (i) excluding
t x  from AS, and (ii) imposing an interest elasticity of –2.0 on IS.  In both cases the estimated
models were stable in spite of policy’s less than one-for-one response of the funds rate to
inflation.
Whether or not monetary policy is stabilizing depends on policy and private behavior.  We
found that over the pre-Volcker-Greenspan era (1959:1-1979:3), Fed behavior appears not to be
stabilizing when we impose the restrictions on aggregate supply that Taylor (1999b) imposes.  In
contrast, when we impose AS restrictions implied by the dynamic New Keynesian model, policy23
over the period appears to be stabilizing.  In both cases we estimate that the Fed adjusted the
funds rate less than one-for-one with inflation.
IV.  The Disappearance of Money from Monetary Policy Analyses
Money plays no role in New Keynesian models of monetary policy.  To some observers this
may seem odd.  This section reviews and discusses the reasons for money’s disappearance.  The
section then turns to some empirical implications of reintroducing money.
IV.1 Why Money Disappeared
Money disappeared for both practical and theoretical reasons.  Throughout the 1980s, the
Federal Reserve paid fairly close attention to the growth of various monetary aggregates in
setting its target for the federal funds rate.  Target growth rates for aggregates were established
and taken seriously by observers of monetary policy.  A decade ago researchers at the Federal
Reserve Board developed the “P-Star” model, which relied on stable long-run values of velocity
and output growth, to use M2 growth to predict inflation [Hallman, Porter and Small (1991)].
Although doubts were raised at the time, any hope of exploiting M2 growth to forecast inflation
evaporated when M2 velocity began to behave erratically in the early 1990s.
20  Since then, as a
practical move, the Fed has deemphasized growth rates of aggregates as indicators of inflation.
Just this year, the Federal Open Market Committee formalized this deemphasis, as the minutes
from the June 27-28, 2000 meeting indicate:
In contrast to its earlier practice, the Committee at this meeting did not establish
ranges for growth of money and debt in 2000 and 2001. The legal requirement to
set and announce such ranges recently had expired, and the members did not view24
the ranges as currently serving a useful role in the formulation of monetary policy.
Owing to uncertainties about the behavior of the velocities of money and debt,
these ranges had not provided reliable benchmarks for the conduct of monetary
policy for some years. Nevertheless, the Committee believed that the behavior of
these aggregates retained value for gauging economic and financial conditions
and that such behavior should continue to be monitored. Moreover, Committee
members emphasized that they would continue to consider periodically issues
related to their long-run strategy for monetary policy, even if they were no longer
setting ranges for the money and debt aggregates.  [Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (2000).]
Theoretical developments in the past decade reinforce the Fed’s pragmatic response to
unstable M2 velocity.  Several authors showed that a nominal anchor need not come from control
of a monetary aggregate:  a policy rule that sets the nominal interest rate can uniquely determine
the price level even in a rational expectations model.
21  This contradicted Sargent and Wallace’s
(1975) famous result that interest rate rules cannot determine the price level.
22  These
developments initiated a literature about interest rate rules that continues to flourish.
23
Several considerations arise from the absence of money in the analytical framework.  First,
even if the Fed ignores money when it sets the funds rate, this does not imply that money plays
                                                
20 Christiano (1989) raised some doubts.
21 Authors include McCallum (1981, 1983) and Leeper (1991).  Related work falls under the rubric of the “fiscal
theory of the price level” advocated by Sims (1994) and Woodford (1998).
22 Sargent (1979) states the result as:  “There is no interest rate rule that is associated with a determinate price level
(p. 362).”  Non-rational expectations predecessors to Sargent and Wallace include Patinkin (1949) and Gurley and
Shaw (1960).25
no role in the transmission of monetary policy or in individuals’ and firms’ consumption,
investment, employment, and pricing decisions.  In terms of the New Keynesian model, absence
of money from the policy rule does not justify its absence from the IS and AS relationships.
Interest rates need not be the only channel through which monetary policy affects economic
activity.
Second, the fact that the Fed can ignore money without losing a nominal anchor does not
imply the Fed does ignore it.  The FOMC minutes leave open the possibility that the Fed may
again choose to pay attention to monetary aggregates.  For example, it is hard to imagine that if
M2 growth were to exceed 20 percent for four consecutive quarters that there would be no
tendency for the FOMC to adjust its funds rate target in response.
Third, even if the Fed now ignores money, it certainly has not always ignored it.  Historical
interpretations of policy behavior that ignore money run the risk of seriously misinterpreting past
policy actions.
Finally, if money plays any role at all in the FOMC’s settings for the funds rate, then money
is likely to enter private sector expectations of future funds rates.  Money, therefore, will enter
dynamic IS or AS relationships through the expectations terms, once expectations are solved out.
IV.2 Adding Money
We add to the New Keynesian model a function that makes the demand for real money
balances (MD) depend on the current nominal interest rate and current income.  To focus on the
marginal contribution of adding money to a model with simple policy rules, in what follows we
                                                
23 Analyses of the price level, inflation and monetary policy without money are creeping into principles textbooks
[see Romer (2000) and Stiglitz and Walsh (2000)].26




tt i ty t t M p i y lags αα α ε −=+ + + + (22)
where M is a broad monetary aggregate, y is output (or income), and 
MD ε  is an exogenous
disturbance to the demand for money.  We exclude potential output entirely from MD.  Money
enters the econometric models in logged form.
Money is taken to be M2.  Clearly, the federal funds rate is not the opportunity cost of M2.
Based on the large models estimated in Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996), modeling the details of the
links between the markets for reserves and broad money complicate without substantively
changing the analysis.  In addition, Gordon and Leeper (1994) found that correctly accounting
for the own rate of return on M2 in computing the opportunity cost does not appreciably alter the
sorts of conclusions that concern us here.
As discussed in section II, there is the potential for confounding behavior described by IS
with that described by either MD or MP.  For the present purposes, we seek to minimize those
identification problems by treating ( , ) tt yp as being determined in an “inertial” sector of the
economy.  This assumption treats output and inflation as predetermined for monetary variables:
disturbances to MD and MP behavior affect y and p with a one-period lag.  By lumping output
and price determination into a single sector, we can no longer claim to have identified behavioral
IS and AS equations; instead, we now have “x” and “p” equations.27
The empirical work in this section contrasts two assumptions about policy behavior:  the
conventional Taylor rule, as given by (4) in section II, and an even simpler rule in which the
Fed’s choice for the funds rate depends only on current money growth:
24
01 1 MP(M rule): [( ) ] .
MP
tm t t t iM M γγ µ ε − =+ − −+ (23)
We have chosen to normalize this rule on the nominal interest rate, but it is equally consistent to
imagine this as a rule determining the supply of money, where that supply choice is sensitive to
the nominal interest rate.
We order the equations “x,” “p,” MD, and MP and the variables x, p, M, and i.  Common to
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where either  x ×  and  p ×  are non-zero with  0 M ×=  (conventional Taylor rule) or  M ×  is non-zero
with  0 xp ×= ×=  (M rule).  Coefficients denoted  1 ×  reflect the homogeneity restriction making
money demand the demand for real balances.  The specification removes any dynamics from
policy behavior.
We estimate the models from 1959:1 to 2000:2.  For the model with the Taylor rule,
estimates of the coefficients in  0 A  imply
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24 In estimation, we annualize the growth rate of money, so 4( ) 1 MM t t − −  appears in (23).28
where we suppress the lagged coefficients in money demand, all constants, and the coefficient on
the output gap in the price equation.
25  It is clear that when the demand for money is appended to
this model with a Taylor rule for policy, the variables can be solved recursively:  the first
equation yields  t x , which from the second equation implies  t p ; together these yield  t i  from the
policy rule in (25), and  t M  comes from the money demand equation in (25), given the value for
exogenous potential output, 
p
t y .  Because M and i are not determined simultaneously, estimates
of money demand have no effect on estimates of policy behavior.
The estimated parameters in (25) seem reasonable.  The short-run semi-elasticity of money
demand is negative and the short-run income elasticity is positive.  In contrast to what we found
estimating a model with severely restricted dynamics (see equation (11)), policy appears to
adjust the funds rate less than one-for-one with inflation.  This difference underscores the
importance of all the model’s identifying assumptions when drawing inferences about policy
behavior from estimated policy rules.  Model (11) determines x and i simultaneously through IS
behavior; model (25) determines them recursively due to inertial behavior.  In spite of the
estimated policy behavior, the model is stable.
Figure 7 reports the response functions over a four-year horizon for the model with a Taylor
rule.  Responses to MP shocks are depicted in the fourth column:  a policy contraction raises the
funds rate substantially and reduces the money stock, generating a liquidity effect.  Output has a
strange positive blip in the quarter after the shock, but then declines, following a hump-shaped
path.  There is no effect on the price level.  Policy disturbances explain at most 13 percent of
                                                
25 All current and lagged coefficients in the output and price equations are identical between the two models with
different two policy rules.29
output, 41 percent of M2, and, in the initial period, over 80 percent of the funds rate.  After four
years, only 40 percent of funds rate variability is due to MP disturbances.
The endogeneity of policy appears in the first three panels of the bottom row of the figure.
An “x” shock, which reduces output and the price level, produces a modest response from policy,
while a “p” shock, which moves output and inflation in opposite directions, engenders a stronger
offsetting reaction.  Over 40 percent of funds rate fluctuations at four-year horizons arise from
reactions to “p” shocks.
Policy also responds to money demand disturbances.  An MD shock lowers M2 on impact.
This is followed by falling prices and initially lower output; after about two years, output rises
above its initial level.
26  Policy raises the funds rate smoothly, gradually returning it to its pre-
shock level.  The Taylor rule prevents the funds rate from jumping when MD shocks strike.
Estimates of the model with the alternative M rule in (23) yield:
27
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The large estimated coefficient on money growth, by conventional wisdom, implies that policy
was stabilizing.
28  The model is no longer recursive, as the equations in (26) simultaneously
determine M and i.  Note that the negative correlation between money and interest rates, which
(25) attributes entirely to the interest elasticity of money demand, now gets split into a stronger
negative demand elasticity and a positive supply elasticity.
                                                
26 Textbook analyses typically have positive money demand shocks lowering the price level.  In simulations of the
New Keynesian model, however, the pattern depicted in Figure 7 is common.
27 Separate coefficients on  Mt  and  1 Mt−  are estimated to be 2.913 and –2.902, so imposing equal and opposite
coefficients does not move the estimates far from the peak of the likelihood function.
28 In the New Keynesian model, this coefficient also eliminates indeterminacy of equilibria.30
Dynamic responses to the shocks in the “inertial” sector, shown in Figure 8, are similar to
those in the model with a Taylor rule.  From the standpoint of endogenous reactions to the
disturbances that have occupied much of the attention of New Keynesian authors, the two policy
rules are nearly indistinguishable.  Some differences show up in the effects of exogenous shifts
in policy:  with an M rule a contraction generates a hump-shaped decrease in output and a
smooth decline in the price level.
Three differences between the models are worth noting.  First, comparing Figure 7 and
Figure 8, a monetary contraction under a Taylor rule only temporarily changes the level of the
money stock, while under an M rule it permanently does so.  This implies that under a Taylor
rule, the open market operation that initially raises the funds rate must be reversed to bring the
money stock back to its original level.  Second, the money stock appears to be more endogenous
under an M rule:  at most, 20 percent of the variation in M is attributed to exogenous MD shocks.
With a Taylor rule, over 60 percent of M fluctuations are due to MD, providing a substantial role
to exogenous factors in determining the money supply.
Finally, we formally test the overidentifying restrictions in the two models.  The model with
a Taylor rule imposes one less restriction than does the model with an M rule.  We obtain:
Taylor rule M rule
ξ  = 418.3 ξ  = 207.4
SC = 112.2 SC = 117.3
AC = 44 AC = 46
p = 0.00 p = 0.00
SC is the Schwarz criterion and AC is the Akaike criterion.31
By any criterion the data reject both models.  The test statistic in the M rule model is
substantially less than in the Taylor rule model.  These results suggest that a rule that makes the
nominal interest rate respond to money growth – and nothing else – certainly fits not worse than
a Taylor rule.
Estimates of identical models under two qualitatively different policy rules yield fairly
similar results when judged by system properties like impulse response functions and stability.
Based solely on estimated policy rules, however, the two models look very different.
IV.3 The Recent Period
Much current research on Federal Reserve behavior draws sharp distinctions between the
pre-1979 and the post-1979 periods.  Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) focus on the 1980-1995
period, Fuhrer and Estrella (1999) consider breaks in policy occurring in 1979:3, 1982:3, and
1987:2, while Taylor (1999a) estimates his rule from 1987:1-1997:3.  We reestimate the two
models in (25) and (26) over the period 1982:1-2000:2.  The New Keynesian literature has
concluded that during this period the Fed stabilized the economy by adjusting the funds rate
strongly in response to inflation; it is also a period in which many authors believe no harm is
done from ignoring money.
Estimates from the model with a Taylor rule are
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System estimates do not recover a policy response to inflation that is even close to exceeding 1.0.
In contrast, OLS estimates of the policy rule yield
1 OLS: ( ) .035 , 1.03 .13
(.006) (.19) (.10)
tt t t ip p x − =− − + (28)32
consistent with conclusions of earlier authors that policy was stabilizing.  Impulse response
functions for the model estimate a small anomalous price response following an exogenous
monetary policy contraction (not reported).
Estimates of the model with an M rule over the 1982:1-2000:2 period offer a different
interpretation of policy behavior
1










With the response of the funds rate to money growth exceeding 1.0, policy appears to be
stabilizing.  OLS estimates of the policy rule tell a different tale:   1 ( ) .049 . .344
(.005) (.072)
tt t iM M − =− +
Responses to MP shocks in this model are not reported because they look very similar to those in
Figure 8.
This section has presented evidence that the exclusion of money from New Keynesian
empirical analyses is not innocuous.  Substantive conclusions about the role of monetary policy
and the behavior of the Federal Reserve can change when money is reintroduced in a way that
generates interactions between MD and MP behavior.  We also demonstrated that in practice it is
difficult to distinguish a monetary policy that adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to
inflation and output from a policy that adjusts the rate in response to the growth rate of the
money supply.  In our results, the model with an M rule looks more reasonable than the model in
which money is irrelevant to policy choice.
V.  Stability in an Identified VAR Framework
Section II estimated tightly parameterized behavioral relationships with simple policy rules.
Section IV loosened the restrictions on dynamics in equations describing private behavior while
it maintained simple static policy rules.  To complete the progression, this section allows also for33
freely estimated dynamics in policy behavior, leading to specifications in line with the approach
taken in the identified VAR literature.
We show that when dynamics are left unrestricted, the models exhibit remarkable stability
across sub-periods.  With the loss of parsimony comes increased sampling error and less
precisely estimated parameters.  To reduce sampling error we adopt the Bayesian methods
developed by Sims and Zha (1998), and employed by Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) and Leeper
and Zha (1999).
The section reports estimates from two weakly identified VARs.  First we revisit the three-
variable system consisting of output, the price level, and the federal funds rate.  Although the
system is fairly stable over time, it exhibits the price puzzle that has received attention in VAR
work:  an exogenous easing of policy lowers the funds rate, raises output, and lowers inflation.
29
The second model adds money to the system with two important effects:  the price puzzle
disappears and the responses to exogenous shifts in policy become more stable.
In choosing sub-periods we face the usual problem that some “interesting” episodes may be
too short to be informative.  With brief time series, sampling error alone can dominate the
estimates and produce misleading inferences.  We check stability by estimating the system over
three sub-periods that coincide with ones frequently studied in work on Fed behavior:  1959:1-
2000:2; 1959:1-1979:3; 1959:1-2000:2 with 1979:4-1982:4 excluded.  The models are estimated
with four unrestricted lags and a constant term in each equation.
30  We found that adding
                                                
29 Sims (1992) and Eichenbaum (1992) discuss the price puzzle.
30 In Sims and Zha’s (1998) notation, the tightness of the prior is set as  0.5 0 λ = , 0.4 1 λ = , 1.0 23 λλ == ,
0.2 4 λ = , 1.0 5 µ = , and  5 6 µ = .34
potential GDP contributes little to the interpretation of results in this section, so we have
dispensed with that variable.
V.1 Three-Variable  Model
As in section IV, we treat output and inflation as determined in an inertial sector of the
economy.  This implies policy disturbances affect y and p with a one-period lag.  We also take
seriously the argument that an operational policy rule must make policy choice depend on
observables.  In the three-variable economy, where y and p are not observed contemporaneously,
an operational rule sets the funds rate as a function of lagged values of all three series.
Because the VAR coefficients in this model are not interpretable, we move directly to the
impulse response functions displayed in Figure 9.  In each panel we report the three point
estimates corresponding to the three sub-periods, and a shaded region, which is a 68 percent
error band associated with model estimated from 1959:1 to 1979:3.
31  When for the three sub-
periods the responses to a shock fall within the error bands, the model makes stable predictions
of the effects of that shock.  For many policy purposes, this is sufficient evidence of stability.
Most responses over a four-year horizon fall within the error bands.  Notable exceptions are
the response of output and prices to a policy disturbance:  the impacts of policy appear to weaken
as more recent data are included in the sample.  Another difference is that over the full sample,
the funds rate responds more strongly to a “p” shock.  This pattern is consistent with the view
that in the Volcker-Greenspan era, the Federal Reserve has placed increased emphasis on
stabilizing inflation.  Because in the model, both “p” and “y” shocks move output and prices in
                                                
31 The error bands are computed from 50,000 draws using procedures developed by Sims and Zha (1999) and
Waggoner and Zha (2000).35
the same direction, they are both consistent with disturbances that shift aggregate demand.  No
shock in the model looks like aggregate supply.
Exogenous monetary expansions have strong and persistent effects on output.  Even after
four years, output remains well above its pre-shock level.  The perverse response of the price
level, though less pronounced in recent data, in consistent across sub-periods.  The stronger price
puzzle exhibited in data up to 1979 conforms to Hanson’s (2000a) findings in a different system
of variables.
Figure 9 exhibits anomalies and enough instability that we are not comfortable with the
identification of policy in the model.  To address our concerns, we turn to a model with money.
V.2 Four-Variable  Model
To identify policy behavior in the four-variable model with money, it is crucial to separate













where the equations appear in columns in the order “y,” “p,” MD, MP, and variables appear in
rows ordered y, p, M, i.  We impose no additional restrictions on this matrix and no restrictions
lagged variables.  Over the three sample periods, the estimates of  0 A  are36
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In all periods, money demand is estimated to have a negative interest elasticity and positive price
and income elasticities.  Over the entire sample and over the period up to 1979, the Fed raised
the funds rate in response to higher money growth.  When the 1979-1982 period is excluded, the
policy response to current money growth changes from positive to negative.  It may be tempting
to infer from this that policy behavior changed in important ways.  This parameter is but one of
many that describes policy behavior in the VAR.  The implications of changes in that parameter
must be gleaned from the entire model.
Figure 10 illustrates the pitfalls of inferring policy behavior from a single parameter in the
policy rule.  Dynamic responses to policy disturbances are remarkably stable.  Point estimates
from the three sub-periods lie within the 68 percent error bands derived from the 1959-1979
period.  There is some evidence in recent years that the output effects of policy shocks have
weakened and the price effects have strengthened.  In addition, much of the variance of the
policy shocks over the entire sample derives from the 1979-1982 period (note the smaller shock
when that period is excluded).  There is no evidence of a price puzzle:  point estimates of price
responses to a monetary contraction never rise, though the error band places some probability on
a higher price path.
In contrast to the three-variable system, where both “p” and “y” shocks look like they shift
aggregate demand, we now see distinct AS and AD disturbances.  A “y” shock moves output and37
prices in the same direction, as one would expect from AD, while a “p” shock moves them in
opposite directions, as would an AS disturbance.  By separating the two kinds of aggregate
shocks, the model allows a richer interpretation of policy behavior than can be gleaned from the
model without money.  When output and prices move together, policy responds to counteract the
output effects.  When output and prices move in opposite directions, policy tries to counteract the
price effects.  This pattern of policy responses is consistent with those found in the simple
models with a Taylor rule (e.g., Figure 2), but they appear under very different identifying
assumptions.
Some instability does show up in the model with money.  The price effects of MD
disturbances appear to be much weaker in models using recent data.  And as in the three-variable
system, the response of policy to a “p” shock is stronger in recent years, though now we can
interpret the “p” shock as AS.
In contrast to the previous models, the four-variable VAR has only one overidentifying
restriction.  When estimated from 1959-1979, the data do not reject the model by any criterion:
the test statistic is ξ  = 1.04; SC = 4.43, AC = 2.0, p = .69.  Over the full sample there is more
evidence against the model:  ξ  = 4.92; SC = 5.12, AC = 2.0, p = .03.
Adding money alters many of the inferences from an identified VAR.  Money appears to
stabilize the system across time, it eliminates the anomalous price puzzle following MP shocks,
and it helps to distinguish aggregate supply from non-monetary policy aggregate demand
disturbances.  The instability of M2 velocity since the early 1990s, which has motivated some
researchers to eliminate money altogether from their analyses, does not appear to raise
difficulties for identifying monetary policy behavior.  Neither does it interfere with the stability
of predictions about the dynamic impacts of exogenous shifts in policy.38
V.3  Implications of VAR Estimates
New Keynesian analyses with simple policy rules consistently find that Federal Reserve
behavior has been qualitatively different since 1979.  Indeed, many authors attribute the superior
performance of the U.S. economy over the past decade to superior policy making.  Central to this
conclusion is that estimates of simple rules display substantial instability across time.  We find
no such instability in loosely identified VAR models with money.  The contrast in our findings
raises the possibility that some authors have over-interpreted the apparently shifting parameters
in simple policy rules.  The VAR literature, which does not attempt to reduce all policy behavior
to two parameters, leads one to doubt the New Keynesian conclusions about policy.
32
Views about the price puzzle in VARs have been influenced by Sims’s (1992) argument.
The Fed bases its choices on more information than small VARs contain, Sims argues, so what
appears in a VAR to be an exogenous policy move is actually a response to extra-model
information about aggregate supply disturbances.  If this behavior is systematic, it can create a
pattern of lower funds rates being followed by higher output and lower inflation.  That view led
to expanding VARs to include commodity prices, which serve as an “information variable” about
supply developments, and diminishes or eliminates the price puzzle.
Hanson (2000a) questions the commodity price fix for the price puzzle.  He shows that with
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans’s (1999) recursive identification scheme, allowing the Fed to
respond to current information in commodity prices does not resolve the price puzzle in data
                                                
32 Evidence from estimates of policy “reaction functions” supports the VAR findings.  For example, Sims (1999)
estimates a regime-switching equation describing the Fed’s behavior.  Although he finds that parameters describing
systematic policy responses to the economy seem to shift across regimes, allowing for such shifts contributes little to
the overall fit of the equation.39
before 1979.
33  We cannot discuss these arguments in detail here.  We are sympathetic to
Hanson’s view that the role of commodity prices in policy behavior is poorly understood, and
that they seem like a weak reed on which to rest identification of policy.  We also believe that the
role of commodity prices in helping to identify policy behavior has been overemphasized.  In the
four-variable identified VAR system, exogenous policy contractions never exhibit a price puzzle:
the price level smoothly and strongly declines in all sample periods.  These results obtain without
the contrivance of commodity prices.  Conditioning on commodity prices is neither necessary
nor sufficient for resolving the price puzzle.
VI.  Concluding Remarks
New Keynesian research has been relatively silent in offering advice on how, at the
frequency of FOMC meetings, the Fed should behave.  Few authors suggest the FOMC should
mechanically obey the simple rule assumed in the theory.  The most detailed discussion of the
practical application of a simple rule comes from Taylor (1993a), who suggests using the rule as
an input to policy making by comparing recent FOMC decisions to the rule.  And forecasts could
include forecasts of the funds rate from the rule.  The analysis, Taylor suggests, could include a
range of forecasts corresponding to different coefficients in the rule.  This suggestion is very
close to how Leeper and Zha (1999) use an identified VAR to conduct counterfactual policy
analysis.  Jansson and Vredin (2000) propose blending the two approaches.  From the standpoint
of a practical policy analyst, therefore, the two approaches could be applied in similar ways.
                                                
33 The price puzzle is not mere VAR esoterica.  Taking Hanson’s findings as background, Barth and Ramey (2000)
propose that the price puzzle actually is no puzzle.  Through the “cost channel,” a monetary contraction reduces
“working capital,” and has impacts on both aggregate demand and aggregate supply.  Under certain elasticities, the
equilibrium price level should rise after a contraction.  They offer industry-level support for the view that monetary
contractions reduce output and raise price-wage ratios.40
Applying the estimated New Keynesian models to the kind of policy analysis Taylor suggests
leads to a quandary.  In all the NK models we estimated, the inflation effects of policy
disturbances – or deviations from the estimated policy rule – are minimal.  By extension,
changes in policy parameters, if private decision makers view them as temporary, will also have
trivial impacts on inflation.  It is not at all clear what monetary policy can do to stabilize inflation
in the estimated models.
We introduced the paper by noting that policy analysts face tough choices.  Our results do
nothing to make those choices easier.  But an analyst who wishes to base policy advice on a
stylized model and a simple policy rule should be aware of the pitfalls of doing so.  While the
stories are compelling, they also appear to be fragile.  The tradeoff between simplicity and
robustness is an unpleasant reality of policy analysis.
To be sure, our analysis did not exploit all the structure embodied in the canonical IS-AS-MP
New Keynesian model.  Cross-equation restrictions implied by dynamic behavior may help
resolve some of the identification problems we highlighted.  On the other hand, experience
suggests that those dynamic restrictions are precisely the ones most at odds with data.
It is mistaken to regard this paper as running a horse race between stylized models with
simple rules and identified VARs with complex dynamics and loose behavioral interpretations.
Each has its place in policy advising.  For a model to help inform policy choice, though, its
identifying assumptions should be robust and its fit – both in-sample and out-of-sample – should
be respectable.
We have argued, and demonstrated in several ways, that it is treacherous to draw inferences
about policy effects solely from policy rules estimated in isolation from a complete macro41
model.  System estimates of policy parameters can differ substantially from single-equation
estimates.  And system properties do not align well with values of particular policy parameters.
A central theme of the New Keynesian literature is that the Fed’s performance in the
Volcker-Greenspan era is far superior to its performance in earlier periods.  This dramatic
conclusion is based on the finding that policy parameters change across the two sub-periods in
ways that New Keynesian models predict produce more stable economic outcomes in the recent
period.  We find that from the perspective of system estimation, instability of policy rules does
not appear to be a serious concern.  Even if particular policy parameters are unstable, when the
dynamics of behavior are well modeled, the equilibrium effects of policy are quite stable.  And
it’s the equilibrium effects that concern policy makers.
At a minimum our results argue forcefully that the bold New Keynesian conclusion that U.S.
monetary policy has improved dramatically in the past 20 years deserves more careful scrutiny.42
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Figure 3.  Implied Shocks in Taylor￿s Model 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9.  Three-Variable Identified VAR Over Various Sub-Periods 


















































































Figure 10.  Four-Variable Identified VAR Over Various Sub-Periods 
( 00:2; i￿i￿ 79:3; ---- 79-82 excluded) 
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